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RULE 24(a)(1) LIST OF PARTIES 
Case No. C85-5168 
Plaintiff 
CAHOON & MAXFIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE 
PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah corporation; and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE 
Third-Party Defendants 
D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE A. JUDD, husband and wife 
Case No. C87-6497 
Plaintiffs 
D. STODDARD JUDD and VALENE A. JUDD, husband and wife 
Defendants 
BRUCE McMULLIN; WESTERN ENVIRO-SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah corporation; 
WATERSIDE ASSOCIATES, a limited partnership; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE 
PROPERTIES, INC., general partner; MACHAN-HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation; and W.E.S./MHP VENTURE, as a partnership 
or unincorporated joint venture 
The cases have been consolidated. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(j) (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly find that D. Stoddard 
Judd and Valene A. Judd (the "Judds") breached their duty to defend 
and warrant title? The Supreme Court may review the evidence in a 
case in equity. However, "due to the advantaged position of the 
trial court, [the Supreme Court] indulge[s] considerable deference 
to his findings and do[es] not interfere with them unless the 
evidence so clearly preponderates against them that [the Supreme 
Court] is convinced that a manifest injustice has been done." 
Hatch v^ Bastian. 567 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). 
2. Did the trial court properly find that appellees 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Waterside") did not waive 
the Judds1 duty to defend? The standard of review is the same as 
that for issue #1 above. 
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STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann, Section 57-1-12 (1990) (emphasis added). 
Form of warranty deed — Effect. 
Conveyance of land may be substantially in the following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby 
conveys and warrants to (insert 
name), grantee, of (insert place of 
residence), for the sum of dollars, the 
following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the 
premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of 
, 19 . 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and 
assigns, of the premises therein named, together with all the 
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with 
covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, 
that he is lawfully seised of the premises that he has good right 
to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and 
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free 
from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof 
in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims 
whatsoever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be briefly 
inserted in such deed following the description of the land. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
a) Nature of the Case. This case involves disputes 
between Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company ("Cahoon"), Waterside 
and the Judds over title to a parcel of property (the "Property") 
conveyed by the Judds by warranty deed and eventually acquired by 
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Waterside. Waterside claimed that the Judds breached their duty to 
defend and warrant title. 
b) Course of Proceedings. A bench trial was conducted 
before Judge Timothy R. Hanson on November 14, 1989. Cahoon was 
not present, its claims having been settled prior to trial. All 
other parties were represented by counsel at trial. 
The matter proceeded by proffer of testimony by all 
parties through their respective attorneys, and exhibits were 
marked and received into evidence. After having received the 
pleadings on file, the evidence and exhibits of the parties, and 
the pre- and post-trial briefs submitted by the parties to the 
court, and having considered the arguments of counsel, the trial 
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
in favor of Waterside. 
c) Disposition at Trial Court. The trial court found 
that the Judds breached their duty to defend and warrant title 
entitling Waterside to be indemnified for the costs they incurred 
in defending title and settling the fee title claims of Cahoon. 
The Judds have appealed the trial court's decision. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Western Enviro-Systems, Inc. ("Western Enviro11) purchased 
the Property from the Judds by Warranty Deed on August 17, 1983. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 9. The Warranty Deed given to 
Western Enviro by the Judds contained the customary requirement to 
"defend and warrant" title to the buyer. The Warranty Deed 
contained the exceptions as stated below: 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Restrictions and Rights of Way, 
currently of record and/or enforceable in law and equity, 
and general property taxes for the year 1983 and 
thereafter, in any and all water rights of record. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9. (TR:00870, page 15, lines 11-
16) . 
By Quit Claim Deeds, Western Enviro and R. Bruce McMullin 
conveyed their interest in the Property to W.E.S./MHP Joint 
Venture. Third-Party Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 11 and 12. On June 28, 
1985, W.E.S./MHP Joint Venture transferred the property to 
Waterside Associates by Warranty Deed. Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 15. 
On September 27, 1985, Cahoon filed suit against third-
party plaintiffs, Waterside, claiming, among other things, a fee 
simple interest to a ditch area that cut through Waterside's 
development. Third-Party Plaintiffs' Exhibits 29 and 30. When 
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sued by Cahoon, Waterside made demand upon the Judds to defend the 
title and filed and served their third-party complaint. (TR:00870, 
pages 8-9, 16-17) Third-Party Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 34. 
Rather than defend title, the Judds began a non-judicial 
foreclosure proceeding against Waterside in September of 1986. 
(TR:00870, pages 8, 16-17) Following a hearing on August 6, 1987, 
the court entered a preliminary injunction against the Judds 
enjoining them from proceeding with their foreclosure action. 
(TR:00870, pages 8-9) That order is not part of this appeal. 
After consideration of Cahoon's claims and the potential 
effects of an adverse ruling on the entire project, Waterside 
determined that the risk of an adverse finding warranted some 
attempt at settlement and compromise with Cahoon. (TR:00870, pages 
7-10) 
Prior to trial, Waterside and Cahoon reached a stipulated 
resolution of their claims. (TR:00870, page 7, lines 11-16) The 
Judds refused offers to participate in the negotiations that led to 
the settlement between Waterside and Cahoon. (TR:00870, pages 10-
11) The Judds1 defense of title consisted of retaining various 
attorneys (TR:00870, pages 16-18), doing some minimal research 
(TR:00870, page 20, lines 16-18) and appearing at trial claiming 
that they were then ready to defend title. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly found that the Judds breached 
their duty to defend and warrant title. The evidence proffered at 
trial showed that (1) the Judds did not accept the defense of 
title, or relieve Waterside of the necessity of defending against 
the claims of Cahoon; (2) the Judds did not provide any real or 
effective assistance with regard to defending against Cahoon's 
title claim; and (3) the only action taken by the Judds was to hire 
counsel, obtain an attorneys opinion and research Cahoon1s records. 
Actual eviction is not necessary for a claim of breach of warranty 
of title. The trial court properly applied Utah case law in ruling 
that the Judds breached their duty to warrant title. 
Waterside did not waive the Judds1 duty to defend. The 
evidence proffered at trial was conclusive that the Judds refused 
to participate in the defense of title despite requests from 
Waterside to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
The Judds1 arguments on appeal can be separated into two 
general contentions: (1) The evidence is insufficient for a finding 
that the Judds breached their duty to defend and warrant title; and 
(2) Waterside waived their right to require Judds to defend title. 
As discussed below, the Judds1 arguments are not supported by the 
6 
law or facts, and the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE JUDDS BREACHED 
THEIR DUTY TO DEFEND AND WARRANT TITLE AND THE THAT 
FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
A. The Judds have Failed to Marshal the Evidence Which Supports 
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. 
While the Judds claim that "the trial court's findings of 
fact related to the Judds duty to defend title are not supported by 
the record" (Appellants1 Brief at page 6), in reality, the Judds1 
appeal is based upon their argument that there are facts in the 
record which might support their theory of the case. On appeal, 
however, the standard of review for findings of fact does not 
involve an analysis of whether the trial could have found for the 
Judds. The focus is on whether the trial court's findings of fact 
are supported by evidence in the record. 
It is clear that a trial court's findings of fact will 
not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Hoth v. White, 
799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 
P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As the Court of Appeals stated in 
Hoth; 
When challenging findings of fact on appeal, the 
appellant must show that the factual findings are clearly 
erroneous. To show clear error, the appellant must 
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marshall all the evidence supporting the trial court's 
factual findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings. 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d at 216 (emphasis added). 
Recently, this Court held: 
An appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict 
of a jury nor the findings of fact made by a trial court. 
If a challenge is made to the findings, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in favor of the facts as found 
by the trial court and then demonstrate that viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, 
the evidence is insufficient to support findings of fact. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Feb. 12, 1991). 
While the Judds challenge the trial court's findings of 
fact, they make no effort to support a reversal based on the 
"clearly erroneous" standard which governs this appeal. Rather 
than marshall the evidence as this Court requires, the Judds simply 
argue that there is testimony in the record which might support 
their theory of the case. In short, unhappy with the outcome 
below, the Judds attempt to reargue the facts of their case in this 
Court in hopes of a more favorable result. 
Indeed, the Judds admit that there is evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's findings of fact when they 
state, "The only indication that the Judds may have failed to 
defend title are contained in the allegations of the Third-Party 
8 
Complaint (TR:00106) and the testimony proffered pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties (TR:00870, page 8, lines 17-19)." 
(Appellants1 Brief at page 7). Of course, Waterside contends that 
the record contains more evidence to support the findings of fact 
than that referred to by the Judds (see Waterside's argument 
below), but the fact remains that the section of the record cited 
by the Judds does indeed support the trial court's findings of 
fact. 
The Judds' efforts fall short of carrying their burden of 
proof to show that given the evidence as a whole the trial court 
clearly erred. The Judds have not marshalled all the evidence. 
B. The Record Supports the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. 
Even though the Judds failed to meet their burden of 
proof and the appeal must be dismissed on that ground alone, it is 
helpful to realize how strongly the record supports the trial 
court's findings. The evidence is overwhelming. 
1. The Judds did no More than Appear at the Time of Trial 
Boldly Announcing that They were Ready to Defeat the 
Adverse Claim to Fee Simple Ownership. 
The Judds argue that the record does not support the 
trial court's findings that the Judds refused to defend title and 
refused to participate in settlement negotiations. There is, 
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however, ample evidence to support the trial court's findings. 
This Court may overturn the trial court's findings only upon a 
determination that the evidence "so clearly preponderates against 
them that . . . a manifest injustice has been done." Hatch v. 
Bastian. 567 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). 
Waterside proffered testimony that the Judds failed and 
refused "to accept the defense of the title, or to relieve 
Waterside Associates, or Machan-Hampshire, or the joint venture of 
any necessity of defending against the claims of [Cahoon], and that 
indeed the response from the Judds was to bring a foreclosure 
action which required Waterside Associates to obtain first a 
temporary restraining order, and later a preliminary injunction to 
avoid the foreclosure of the property." (TR:00870, pages 8-9) 
Waterside "received no real, or effective assistance from any 
counsel hired by Doctor Judd with regard to defending against the 
title claim." (TR:00870, page 10, lines 14-17) Early on in the 
litigation, Waterside had two meetings with counsel for the Judds 
regarding settlement of Cahoonfs claims but nothing ever came of 
them. (TR:00870, pages 10-11) 
The Judds1 proffer also evidenced their lack of 
involvement in defending the title. The Judds had no 
communications from their attorney concerning "any discussions that 
he held of a settlement nature or of assisting in defense of this 
matter whatsoever." (TR:00870, page 21, lines 20-23) 
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The only evidence of anything done by the Judds, other 
than appearing at trial, to defend title consists of the Judds 
hiring three attorneys (TR:00870, pages 16-18); obtaining an 
attorney's opinion in a letter dated November 15, 1986 (TR:00870, 
page 17, lines 10-19), third-party defendants' Exhibit 39; and 
requesting that substituted counsel examine the records of Cahoon. 
(TR:00870, page 20, lines 16-18) There is no evidence that the 
Judds did anything else. They did not even fully answer 
Waterside's Third-Party Complaint against them. (TR: 00870, page 10, 
lines 8-14) 
The testimony and evidence of Waterside was that the 
Judds did little more than appear at the time of trial, with 
knowledge that Waterside had settled, and boldly announce that they 
were ready to defeat Cahoon's claims to fee simple ownership. The 
Judds failed to introduce evidence that they performed their duty 
to defend title. The trial court's finding is not "clearly 
erroneous," but is supported by the evidence. 
2. The Trial Court's Finding that the Judds Breached their 
Warranty of Title was Correct, Because Constructive 
Eviction Under Paramount Title Constitutes a Breach of 
the Covenant of Warranty of Title. 
The Judds misstate the general rule of law concerning a 
breach of covenant of warranty of title. Breach of the covenant 
occurs when it is shown that the grantor did not own the land that 
he purported to convey by the warranty deed description. Creason 
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L. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 404 (1970). However, 
"it is not necessary to show an actual eviction or threat thereof." 
Creason, supra (emphasis added). A grantee is entitled to 
compensation for the damage he suffers "as a result of the breach 
[of warranty of title, including] taking measures as are reasonable 
and necessary to clear up any difficulty which would represent a 
substantial flaw in his title." Creason, supra. The Creason case 
cited by the Judds in their brief is particularly enlightening on 
this point. 
In Creason, the grantee had purchased certain property by 
warranty deed in which the meets and bounds description caused a 
shift of the boundaries. Upon discovering the apparent error in 
the description, the grantee solicited adjoining property owners 
for deeds to correct the error. The solicitation and correction of 
the error cost the grantee at least $50 plus attorneys fees of 
$720. No one evicted the grantee, or even threatened eviction. 
There was no determination by a court that an error existed or that 
the grantor did not own the property he conveyed by warranty deed. 
The court, however, noting the general rule of law stated that the 
"[grantee] would be justified in doing whatever was reasonable and 
prudent to clear [the defect]; and if this involved the necessity 
of employing an attorney, the reasonable expense therefor would be 
compensable." Creason, 470 P.2d at 405-06 (citing Van Cott v. 
Jacklin. 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924)). 
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Waterside discussed the fee claims of Cahoon with 
Cahoon's counsel and, based upon a Supreme Court of Utah case 
entitled State v^ Cox, 29 Utah 2d 127, 506 P.2d 54 (1973), 
concluded that there were factual and legal questions which could 
be found adverse to them, and if the court made those findings, 
reversal on appeal was unlikely. (TR:00870, page 7, lines 1-10) 
Waterside determined that it was prudent to settle the dispute with 
Cahoon if reasonably possible without presenting the fee ownership 
issue for judicial determination, (TR:00870, pages 5-7) That is 
exactly what was done in Creason. The trial court's finding that 
the Judds1 breached their warranty of title is supported by law and 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE JUDDS OWED 
WATERSIDE A DUTY TO DEFEND TITLE WHICH WATERSIDE DID NOT 
WAIVE AND THE JUDDS FAILED TO PERFORM. 
The Judds attempt to shift responsibility to Waterside 
for their failure to defend by claiming that Waterside waived the 
Judds1 duty to defend prior to trial by settling with Cahoon. 
Appellants' Brief, pages 10-11. Their contention is nonsensical 
and unsupported by law. 
Waterside faced an enormous loss in the event Cahoon were 
granted fee title to the Property. Waterside had developed the 
Property prior to Cahoon's fee claims at a cost in excess of a 
million dollars. (TR:00870, page 9, lines 16-17) An adverse ruling 
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would have been disastrous and irreparable. Waterside took the 
prudent and reasonable action in settling the fee claims of Cahoon. 
The Judds contend that the settlement reached by 
Waterside with Cahoon precluded a hearing of the fee claim on its 
merits, thereby preventing the Judds from consummating their 
defense of the title. The Judds were notified of the fee claim of 
Cahoon and were invited to participate in settlement discussions. 
The Judds refused. 
At the outset of the litigation, Waterside made demand 
upon the Judds to defend title and gave the Judds every opportunity 
to participate and defend title to the Property. The Judds refused 
the demands of Waterside and waited instead until trial to proclaim 
their readiness to defend title. Waterside did not at any time 
waive the Judds1 duty to defend title to the Property, but called 
on the Judds to fulfill their obligations under Utah Code Ann. §57-
1-12 (1990). Waterside was forced, by the Judds1 failure to 
respond to their duty to defend, to take the only prudent action 
and on the eve of trial, settle with Cahoon to avoid imminent and 
irreparable harm. 
Waterside did not waive the Judds1 duty to defend title 
when it settled with Cahoon. An analogy can be made to the law of 
insurance to illustrate the non-waiver of the Judds1 duty to defend 
title, as well as the Judds1 breach of that duty and resulting 
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liability. An insurer is bound to defend an insured against 
lawsuits alleging facts and circumstances covered by the policy, 
regardless of the merit of the allegations. Carter v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co. . 473 F. 2d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir. 1973) . The 
insurer's liability for refusing to defend may be for the full 
amount of the insured's detriment, including the risk that the 
insured will settle: 
Once an insurer breaches its contract by refusing to 
defend an action against its insured, it takes the risk 
that the insured will have a judgment entered against 
him, or will accept a settlement with the injured party. 
The insurer is liable on its refusal to defend, and must 
pay the amount of the judgment or settlement . . . . 
Carter, 473 F.2d at 1078. If the insurer elects not to defend, it 
does so at its peril. Carter, supra. 
By refusing to defend title to the Property, the Judds 
breached their contract with Waterside contained in the Warranty 
Deed and took the risk that Waterside would receive an adverse 
judgment or settle with Cahoon. The Judds became liable at the 
time of their failure to defend for any judgment against Waterside 
or any settlement entered into. The settlement ultimately agreed 
to by Waterside and Cahoon did not effect a waiver of the Judds1 
duty to defend, which the Judds had already breached. Instead, as 
under similar circumstances governed by insurance law outlined 
above, the Judds became liable to Waterside to the full extent of 
the settlement together with defense costs. See Carter, supra. 
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The trial court was correct in granting judgment in favor of 
Waterside and against the Judds based on the evidence showing their 
failure to defend title. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court 
in favor of Waterside. There has been no showing that the trial 
court clearly erred in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, 
or that a manifest injustice has been done. 
J2*: DATED this n^ day of August, 1991. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
McPHIE, CONDIE & PECK 
Christopher J. Condie 
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